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the risk-awareness characteristics of users offended on the Internet. The data
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measures taken by the users. Probit and logit regressions show that, conditional
on using the Internet, being female and abstaining from using social media
significantly reduces the risk to be offended on the Internet.
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1 Introduction
The growing number of providers and users of Internet services as well as
social communication networks also raises security issues and resulted in the
emergence of cyber-crime research (see, e.g., Hartel et al, 2011). This article
uses questionnaire data and applies statistical methods to identify users and
their characteristics who were subject to some form of offense on the Internet
and Social media by means of a cluster analysis. In a second step, we analyze
how these characteristics are related to the likelihood of being offended on the
Internet. In particular, we investigate how different safety measures taken by
users affect their protection against cyber-crime.
In parallel to the emergence of cyber-crime science, for governmental
institutions, such as the Ministry of the Interior and police authorities, the
criminal aspects (such as theft of data, hacking, fraud, etc.) have become of
particular interest (see, e.g., the study of Kirchner et al, 2015, in cooperation with
theAustrian FederalMinistry of the Interior). To implement policieswith the goal
to improve cyber-security and to reduce crime (see, e.g., Becker, 1968; Freeman,
1999; Hartel et al, 2011; Dimkov, 2012), knowledge about the actual number
of crimes committed, the socio-demographic structure of the users offended,
factors (variables) raising the probability of an offense as well as the cost of
Internet crime becomes important for a cost-benefit for hackers and the cost of
cyber-crime (see, e.g., Kshetri, 2010; Anderson et al, 2013; Cook et al, 2014).
In addition, also governmental as well as non-governmental institutions
provide guidelines how to responsibly use information technology. Such com-
mandments are e.g. provided by the Computer Professionals for Social Re-
sponsibility (CPSR, 2015) or by Saferinternet.at (2016). For these institutions,
knowledge on the socio-demographic structure of the users offended as well as
user characteristics connected to offenses can be helpful to provide target group
specific information, with the goal to increase the risk-awareness and to reduce
the risk to be offended. Concerning the effectiveness of security awareness,
Bullée et al (2015) showed in experiments that measures to increase security
awareness turned out to be statistically significant.
Regarding academic publications in the field of cyber-crime research, almost
recently, Hartel et al (2011) intensively searched through literature in various
academic disciplines and concluded that “In spite of our efforts we have failed
to find documented scientific studies of how Information Security effectively
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prevents cyber-crime.” By looking for causes of this gap, the authors claim that
problems in information security are hardly reported to the police for several
reasons. For example, a problem in the information security system need not
result in crime.
To get more detailed information on the users to be offended and to quantify
the risk to be offended on the Internet, this article uses the questionnaire data
collected by Kirchner et al (2015) and identifies groups of offended Internet
users. In particular, Section 2 discusses recent results obtained in cyber-crime
research and presents the research questions. Then, Section 3 describes the data.
To obtain information on the security-awareness and the socio-demographic
characteristics of the users offended, Section 4 first presents results obtained
by means of a cluster analysis. In a second step logit and probit regressions
are performed to investigate the impact of user characteristics on the risk to be
offended on the Internet. Section 5 concludes.
2 Cyber-Crime Research
Hartel et al (2011)[Section 2] define crime science as applying scientific methods
to prevent and to detect disorder, particularly crime. Then, referring to Newman
(2009), the authors define cyber-crime as “behaviour in which computers or
networks are a tool, a target, or a place of criminal activity.” By considering
the historical development, “... cyber-crime emerged from hacking. Fraud
schemes in relation with Social Engineering and other criminal activities were
gradually added and connected to the technical and craft skills of the early
hackers” (see Kochheim, 2016). While information security research is engaged
in the development of software to increase IT security, cyber-crime research
is connected to criminology and other social sciences with the goal to prevent
cyber-crime (see, e.g., Hartel et al, 2011). For guidelines to perform information
and communication technology research see e.g. Bailey et al (2012).
In addition, cyber-crime can be divided into “cyber-crime in a narrower
sense”, where offenses are committed by using the technologies of the Internet
(e.g., illegal access to a computer system), and “cyber-crime in a broader sense”
(see, e.g., Bundeskriminalamt, 2015, p. 17), where the Internet is used as
communication medium for criminal activity (e.g., fraud, child pornography,
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and the initiation of sexual contacts with minors). In this article we refer to the
broader definition of cyber-crime.
Let us relate this article to recent literature in cyber-crime research: An
overview on recent developments and results in cyber-crime science is e.g.
provided in Hartel et al (2011) and Dimkov (2012).
Cyber-bullying was investigated in the empirical study of Hinduja and Patchin
(2008). The authors used an online survey tool to collect data from 6,800 users
in the time span December 2004 to January 2005. After focusing on the group
of users not older than 17 years and data cleaning, the authors ended up with
data from 1,378 users. The response variables constructed by the authors are
two victimization variables (“general/serious cyber-bullying victimization”) and
two offending variables (“general/serious cyber-bullying offending”). Regarding
serious cyber-bullying victimization, the authors observe (by applying logistic
regression) that the time spent at the computer, school problems and being a
bullying victim in real life are positively related to victimization. Other variables
such as gender, age, black/white, and peer effects turned out to be insignificant.
Due to the different age structure of the users, relating the study of Hinduja and
Patchin (2008) to the results obtained in this article is difficult.
Information security awareness of Internet users was analyzed in Tsohou
et al (2008) as well as Talib et al (2010). While Tsohou et al (2008) provide
an overview on information security awareness, the study of Talib et al (2010)
is based on survey data containing 333 observations. The authors argue that
– compared to private use – at an individual’s workplace clearer legislation
and regulation about IT security exist. Because of this, the authors claim that
learning about Internet security mainly takes place at an individual’s workplace.
Then, positive spill-over effects to security awareness at home are observed.
Moreover, information on the “the perception of security in e-commerce B2C
(business to customer) and C2C (costumer to customer) websites” is provided by
Halaweh and Fidler (2008), who followed a qualitative approach by interviewing
fifteen customers and twelve organizations’ managers and their IT staff.
Kirchner and Angleitner (2016) analyzed which criminal-relevant phenomena
and activities do occur in social media, to what extent did they reach so far, and
which methods to attack users were applied. By using questionnaire data from
Kirchner et al (2015) the study shows that Facebook (used by 62% of the people
asked in the questionnaire), WhatsApp (50%) and YouTube (46%) are those
social media, which are used most frequently in the age group 14 - 49 years old.
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Regarding police relevant issues, Kirchner and Angleitner (2016) observed that
defective software/malware, hacking, fake accounts, cyber-mobbing (see also
Schneider et al, 2013, and the literature cited there), phishing, cyber-bullying
(see also Hinduja and Patchin, 2008), cyber-stalking, profile copying, sexting
(see also Lee et al, 2013), and happy slapping are the most frequent ways how
users were offended (the order of these terms corresponds to their frequency of
occurrence).
3 Data and Research Questions
The research questions investigated in this article are: (i) “What groups of
persons show an insufficient problem-consciousness concerning cyber-crime
and thus being at particular risk?” and (ii) “What variables increase/decrease
the risk to be offended on the Internet?”. The first question will be investigated
in Section 4.1 by means of a cluster analysis, while Section 4.2 applies binary
regression techniques to analyze the risk to be offended on the Internet. The
following section describes the data used to perform these analyses.
A very first step to investigate the risk of being offended on the Internet
is to look on the number of notifications and complaints collected by police
authorities. For example, the Austrian Ministry of the Interior collects the
number of notifications on a yearly basis (for Austria, see e.g., BM.I, 2015,
“Austrian Security Report”). This report shows the following: For 2014 a decline
in the area of Internet crime is reported (−10.8% compared to 2013), while for
the last decade an increase from 1,794 notified offenses in 2005 to 8,966 notified
offenses in 2014 is observed. After the significant rise in the last decade and the
decrease in 2014, the criminal offenses are less than 10,000, which corresponds
to approximately 0.1% of the total Austrian population. The number of notified
offenses is to be found mainly in the area of cyber-crime in a broader sense, and
particularly, in the field of Internet fraud.
During the same periods, also the number of complaints increased enormously.
In particular, from 1,151 in 2005 to 7,667 complaints in 2013. In parallel to
the number of notifications, the complaints with respect to Internet fraud fell
by 13.5% in the year 2014. However, the value of 6,635 complaints in 2014,
is imperceptibly higher than the value in 2012, where 6,598 complaints were
observed. In addition, police authorities are also concerned about a large dark
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field in the area of cyber-crime, and point out that new criminal phenomena are
in progress (see Bundeskriminalamt, 2015).
To obtain more detailed information, this article uses data from the study
of Kirchner et al (2015), where data on socio-demographic factors as well as
on offenses on the Internet were collected for a target group of N = 3,000
representative users with an age between 14 and 49 years. More details are
provided in Appendix 1. The k = 21 variables obtained from this study are:
yn The binary variable Attacked, where 0 implies that the corresponding
individual was not personally offended on the Internet or social media,
while the variable is 1 if the user was offended personally. The variable
yn is derived and thereby defined as follows: Each individual n was
asked whether she or he was already personally confronted with phishing,
hacking, profile copying, fake accounts, malware, sexting, cyber stalking,
cyber mobbing or cyber bullying. If at least one answer to these questions
was “yes”, we call individual n to be offended on the Internet. In formal
terms the binary variable yn = 1 if individual n was offended, while
yn = 0 if all answers were a “no”. n denotes the index used for the
corresponding person, n = 1, . . . ,N (see question Q.1.· in Appendix 1).
Hence, O = ∑Nn=1 yn.
xn2 The variable Frequency, measuring the frequency of Internet and social
network usage. This variable is an integer ranging from 0 to 2. A value of
0 denotes frequent use (category a in Question Q.2 Appendix 1), 1 stands
for occasional use (category b in question Q.2) and 2 denotes no current
use of social networks (categories c or d in question Q.2).
xn3 The binary variable Gender, where 0 stands for male and 1 for female
(see question Q.3).
xn4 The integer variable Age, measured in years (see question Q.4).
xn5 The variable Size of the City approximates the number of inhabitants of the
city where the individual currently lives. Here, the following categories
are used: 1 abbreviates < 10,000 inhabitants, 2 stands for more than or
equal to 10,000 and less than 50,000 inhabitants, 3 denotes more than or
equal to 50,000 and < 100,000 inhabitants, 4 denotes more than or equal
to 100,000 and < 250,000 inhabitants, while 5 stands for ≥ 250,000
inhabitants (see question Q.5).
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xn6 The integer variable Employment denotes the current employment status,
where 0 stands for unemployment, 1 for part time employment and 2 for
full employment. On leave, retirement, apprenticeship, civil- or military
service and pupils are treated as missing value (see question Q.6 and the
corresponding categories).
xn7 The variable Human Capital (Education), measuring the highest level of
education obtained by individual n. This variable is equal to 1 if no school
was completed, to 2 if the highest degree is from a secondary modern
school (“Pflichschulabschluss” in the Austrian school system), to 3 if
an apprenticeship, a school without general qualification for university
entrance (“Berufsbildende mittlere Schule” or “Allgemeinbildende höhere
Schule ohneMatura” in the Austrian school system) was completed, to 4 if
a grammar school or an equivalent degree (“Berufsbildende höhere Schule”
(e.g., HAK, HLW, HTL) in the Austrian school system) was completed,
while 5 stands for some university degree (or (almost) equivalent degrees
like “Abiturientenlehrgang, Kollege, Pädagogische Akademie” in the
Austrian education system; see question Q.7 and the corresponding
categories).
xnS, j : Binary Security / Incertitude variables: The variable xnS, j , j = 1, . . . ,14,
is set to 0 if an individual did not consider the corresponding security
issues as relevant, while the value of the variable is one if the individual
cared about that particular Internet security issue. These variables follow
from the questions Q.S1 to Q.S14 provided in Table A-7.
Note that our definition of an offense also includes disruptions which need not be
relevant for the police. However, since the questions raised in the questionnaire
of Kirchner et al (2015) follow from expert interviews with the IT-division of
the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, we consider the disruptions reported by the
users either relevant or almost relevant for police authorities. Hence, the definition
of an offense applied in this article can be considered to be slightly broader
than a criminally relevant disruption. For the sample of N = 3,000, the number
of people personally confronted with cyber-crime is O = 470 (= ∑Nn=1 yn).
Comparing the rate O/N ≈ 16% to the notification rate of approximately
0.13%, based on the data provided in BM.I (2015), strongly supports the
arguments provided e.g. in Appendix A of Hartel et al (2011), who claimed that
the number of offenses is above the number of offenses notified by the police. To
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obtain an estimate of the notification rate, we use the Austrian population (≈ 8.5
million) in 2014 and an estimate of the percentage of users in Austria (82%) in
2015 which is supposed to be a good approximation for the year 2014 (Statistik
Austria, 2017). Then 8966/(0.82 ·8500000) ≈ 0.00129. Note, that the difference
between these two rates can either be caused by the claim that people do not
contact the police, even if the offense is relevant for the police, or by the slightly
broader definition of an offense used in this study (yn = 1 can but need not
imply that the offense is criminally relevant). Further reasons for differences are
e.g. sampling effects or measurement errors. The differences observed between
the male and the female population turned out to be small (this difference is also
statistically insignificant at a 5% significance level). In addition, we observed that
from the N = 3,000 sample N∗ = 2,188 individuals currently use social media
and/or the Internet (i.e., the variable xn2 ≤ 1). That is, O/N∗ ≈ 21.48 % of the
actual users were offended. In more formal terms, an estimate of the probability
to use the Internet is P̂ (x2n ≤ 1) = N∗/N = 0.7293, while an estimate of the











Adapt protection settings at the first registration xnS,1
Regularly change password xnS,2
Use different passwords at various platforms xnS,3
Install safety software xnS,4
Do not use unsecured WLAN connections xnS,5
Only communicate with persons known in real life xnS,6
Never provide personal information xnS,7
Read terms and conditions carefully at every registration xnS,8
Deactivate automatic save password facilities xnS,9
Delete cookies xnS,10
Hide/tape microphone and camera xnS,11
Use common sense xnS,12
Do not use social networks xnS,13
Incertitude Characteristics
User does not care about any security issues xnS,14
Offense
(yn = 1 if yes, yn = 0 else)
?
Figure 1: Variables and Effects This figure plots the socio-demographic, the socio-economic and the
security/incertitude variables obtained from the questionnaire study of Kirchner et al (2015). Their
interrelationships are denoted by → , the observation index is n = 1, . . . , N = 3, 000. The last
columns in the corresponding boxes present the abbreviations used for the corresponding variables.
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The data, abbreviated by X ∈ RN×k , contains the observations xn = (yn, xn2,
. . . , xnk)> ∈ Rk for n = 1, . . . ,N = 3,000 and k = 1, . . . ,21. For vectors
and matrices boldface notation is applied. That is to say, z ∈ Rp denotes a
p-dimensional column vector, Z ∈ Rp×q a p × q matrix. zi denotes the i-th
coordinate of the column vector z. z> denotes the transpose of z. I(·) abbreviates
an indicator function. Estimates are labeled by the superscript ̂. Sample means
and sample standard deviations for the variables yn, xni , i = 2, . . . ,7, and xnS, j
are provided in the last column of Table 1. If no answer is provided or if the
answer “don’t know” is chosen for some variable by individual n, we obtain
a missing value. For yn, xn2 and xn3 no missing values are observed. For the
variables age, inhabitants and human capital two, thirty and eighteen missing
values are observed. For the variable Employment where on leave, retirement,
apprenticeship, civil- or military service and pupils are treated as missing values
we get 616 missing values, while for each of the security/incertitude variables
xnS, j 681 missing values are observed. For the cluster analysis performed in
Section 4 all N = 3,000 observations can be used by setting the contribution
for the corresponding variable to zero when obtaining the distance function,
while for the regression analysis observations containing missing values were
excluded by the software package.
The variables presented in Figure 1, contain the socio-demographic charac-
teristics Frequency, Gender, Age and the Size of the City, the socio-economic
characteristics, Employment and Human Capital (education) as well as some
security/incertitude variables. In the cluster analysis performed in Section 4.1
we shall investigate similarities between a subset of these variables, while the
regression results presented in Section 4.2 will analyze how these character-
istics influence the probability to be offended. We expect the probability to
be offended to decrease in the variable Frequency (note that xn2 = 0 denotes
frequent use, ..., xn2 = 2 currently no use). From the previous section we expect
no significant effects for the variable Gender based on the results of Hinduja and
Patchin (2008). Although Hinduja and Patchin (2008) used a different age group,
we also do not expect significant effects for the variable Age. Based on our
literature review the effects of the variables Size of the City and Human Capital
are unclear. By applying the argument of Tsohou et al (2008) that “security
awareness increases due to clearer regulation at work”, we expect the variable
Employment to decrease the probability to be offended. For all security variables
xnS,1 to xnS,13 we expect the probability of an offense to diminish, while the
opposite effect is expected for the incertitude variable xnS,14.
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4 Results
4.1 Groups of Offended and Non-offended Users
The goal of the following exploratory analysis is to find out which individuals
share similar characteristics. In particular, we want to find out whether there are
differences (i) between offended and non-offended individuals or (ii) within the
subset of offended users. To do this we cluster the data described in Section 3,
such that the individuals in the same cluster have stronger similarities than
the individuals collected in the other clusters. In particular, the agglomerate
hierarchical clustering algorithm agnes described in Kaufman and Rousseeuw
(1990, Chapter 5) is applied. The observations used to perform the cluster
analysis are xn =
(
yn, xn2, . . . , xn7, xnS,1, . . . , xnS,14
)> ∈ Rk , where k = 21, for
n = 1, . . . ,N = 3000. The data used to perform the cluster analysis is abbreviated
by X ∈ RN×k , collecting the observations xn, n = 1, . . . , N . Additionally, a
distance function measuring the dissimilarity between the observations xn and
xm has to be chosen. Since the data X contains the numerical variable Age,
the binary variables Offense, Gender and xnS, j as well as variables Frequency,
Size of the City, Employment and Human Capital measured on an ordinal
scale, we follow suggestions in the literature and apply Gower-distances (1971).
Gower-distances are also implemented in the software package R as described
in Maechler et al (2015). In addition to Gower-distances we also performed a
cluster analysis with L1 (= sum of absolute distances or Manhattan distances)
and Euclidean distances. The differences to the results obtained with Gower-
distances are relatively small. In addition, we performed robustness checks such
as excluding the variable Gender, only working with one xnS, j , etc. Although
the choice of the variables impacts the output obtained by the cluster analysis,
the result that for a group of offended users we observe in parallel a group
of non-offended users but with the other characteristics quite similar remains
stable.
By applying this clustering technique to our data X, we observe a high
agglomerative coefficient of AC ≈ 0.98 , measuring the quality of the clustering
method applied to the data (see, e.g., Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990, p. 211).
Based on the dendrogram and with the goal to get a parsimonious description
of the data, we decided to present the result where the data X is clustered into
twelve groups. This decision is based on the observation that for the branches
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on the top of the clustering tree larger differences are observed, while for a
larger number of clusters the differences in the variables of interest for this study
become small.
Table 1 presents results when I = 12 groups are considered. The columns 2
to 13 present the group-specific mean values and the group-specific standard
deviations within the corresponding cluster Ci. The last column presents the
sample means and the sample standard deviations for each variable, obtained
from N = 3,000 observations. The last row presents the number of individuals
assigned to cluster Ci, i = 1, . . . , I = 12. Note that the mean value for the
variable Attack corresponds to the percentage of the individuals offended on
the net, i.e. ON=
470
3000 = 0.1567.
From Table 1 we observe that all individuals offended on the Internet are
contained in the clusters C2, C4, C6, C7 and C12, where C4 and C7 contain
offended users only. The bulk of offended users is contained in Class C4 (this
class contains 457 of 470 offended individuals). In for this class relatively small
deviations to the sample means (provided in the last column) are observed.
Excluding offenses, the characteristics of the individuals in C4 are also very
similar to the individuals in C2 (where only a very small number of offended
users is included). C7 contains mainly young, male users with a slightly higher
mean level of employment. In this group a lot but not all security awareness
variables are high.
Summing up, regarding the security awareness measured by the variables
xnS, j , j = 1, . . . ,14, the clustering results provided in Table 1 do not show very
clear results (i.e., to distinguish offended from non-offended users based on
xnS, j). Hence, the impact of xnS, j = 1, j = 1, . . . ,14, on the probability to be
offended in the Internet seems to be low. In addition, we do not observe strong
differences between the offended and the non-offended clusters regrading the
variables Gender, Employment, Human Capital, Size of the City and Age. That
is, for a cluster of offended users we find in parallel a cluster of non-offended
users where the socio-economic characteristics are quite similar. Therefore,
based on the cluster analysis we do not expect strong impacts of these variables
on the probability to be offended. To obtain more detailed results we proceed to
estimate logit and probit models in the following Section 4.2.
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Table 1:Results obtained from theClusterAnalysis. Results obtained from the cluster analysis.Data set
X, N = 3, 000 observations, k = 21 variables, I = 12 clusters and Gower-distances. For each variable
the first row presents group-specific sample means in the corresponding cluster Ci , i = 1, . . . , 12,
while the second row presents the group-specific sample standard deviations. The last column presents
the mean values and the sample standard deviations (SD) for the corresponding variables, obtained
from all observations n = 1, . . . , N . The last row presents the number of individuals assigned to
cluster Ci . NA denotes “not available”.
Cluster Ci
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 mean/SD
Attacked 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.16 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.157
0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.364
Frequency 0.10 1.37 0.03 1.32 0.35 1.26 1.33 1.80 1.50 0.34 0.33 1.10 0.957
0.31 0.50 0.16 0.65 0.55 0.79 0.58 0.42 0.71 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.763
Gender 0.41 0.51 0.53 0.47 0.29 0.26 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.28 0.00 0.30 0.497
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.58 0.53 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.48 0.500
Age 21.67 31.97 40.55 32.98 35.65 28.13 29.67 35.50 33.00 27.72 33.00 38.60 34.229
4.89 9.91 7.21 9.70 10.49 12.19 6.51 7.18 4.24 7.17 2.65 8.14 10.048
Inhabitants 2.52 2.45 1.95 2.57 3.60 2.22 2.67 3.10 5.00 1.69 5.00 3.40 2.360
1.59 1.74 1.54 1.79 1.81 1.69 2.08 2.02 0.00 1.20 0.00 2.07 1.720
Employment 1.36 1.21 1.29 1.12 0.13 1.03 1.67 1.00 2.00 1.07 2.00 1.00 1.197
0.49 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.34 0.42 0.58 0.47 0.00 0.37 NA 0.50 0.496
Human Capital 2.82 3.77 3.79 3.88 3.66 3.13 4.33 3.90 4.50 3.41 4.00 4.00 3.762
0.91 1.04 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.21 0.58 0.88 0.71 0.73 0.00 0.87 1.020
xnS ,1 0.56 0.72 0.53 0.67 0.54 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.90 0.674
0.51 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.32 0.469
xnS ,2 0.20 0.43 0.35 0.46 0.40 0.00 0.33 0.40 1.00 0.12 0.50 0.40 0.420
0.41 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.58 0.52 0.00 0.33 0.71 0.52 0.494
xnS ,3 0.72 0.65 0.46 0.67 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.06 0.50 1.00 0.627
0.46 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.24 0.71 0.00 0.484
xnS ,4 0.60 0.76 0.60 0.78 0.60 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.731
0.50 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.364
xnS ,5 0.32 0.52 0.47 0.53 0.40 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.90 0.507
0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.58 0.53 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.32 0.500
xnS ,6 0.40 0.77 0.67 0.72 0.69 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.726
0.50 0.42 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.446
xnS ,7 0.48 0.74 0.68 0.74 0.57 0.00 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.18 1.00 0.90 0.716
0.51 0.44 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.58 0.53 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.32 0.451
xnS ,8 0.24 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.333
0.44 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.53 0.472
xnS ,9 0.60 0.57 0.51 0.58 0.34 0.00 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.70 0.552
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.58 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.48 0.497
xnS ,10 0.64 0.59 0.51 0.63 0.57 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.583
0.49 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.493
xnS ,11 0.40 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.20 0.443
0.50 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.42 0.221
xnS ,12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.006
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.080
xnS ,13 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.016
0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.127
xnS ,14 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.020
0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.139
Members 49.00 1549.00 788.00 457.00 62.00 38.00 3.00 10.00 2.00 29.00 3.00 10.00 3000.000
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4.2 The Risk to be Offended on the Internet
In this section we investigate the second question, that is, we consider variables
increasing or decreasing the risk to be offended on the Internet. In this analysis
we consider the N∗ = 2,188 subsample consisting of individuals currently
using the Internet. Hence, all the following results are conditional on using the
Internet. We implicitly assume that only people actually using the Internet were
subject to an offense. Hence, P (yn = 1|x˜n, xn2 = 2) = P (yn = 1| xn2 = 2) = 0.
To investigate this question we have to account for the fact that yn is a binary
variable. In formal terms we consider the events {yn = 1} and {yn = 0},
where users participate, i.e. {xn2 ≤ 1}. Logit and probit regressions (see, e.g.,
Greene, 1997; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) are applied to obtain estimates how
the conditional probability P (yn = 1|x˜n, xn2 ≤ 1) depends on the explanatory
variables x˜n. To avoid strong assumptions on the possible effects arising from
the variables measured on an ordinal scale, we define the binary (dummy)
variable In2(xn2 = 1) which is equal to 1 if the value of the variable frequency
is xn2 = 1, otherwise this variable is zero. In a similar way we obtain the
binary variables In5(xn5 = 1) (living in small cities), In5(xn5 ≥ 3) (living
in lage(r) cities), In6(xn6 = 1) (part time employment), In6(xn6 = 2) (full
employment), In7(xn7 = 3) (medium level of education), In7(xn7 = 4) (high
school education) and In7(xn7 = 5) (university education). By means of a 1
as the first coordinate of the vector of explanatory variables x˜n, we include
an intercept term. Hence, our explanatory variables are x˜n := (1, In2(xn2 =
1), xn3, xn4, In5(xn5 = 1), In5(xn5 ≥ 3), In6(xn6 = 1), In6(xn6 = 2), In7(xn7 =
3), In7(xn7 = 4), In7(xn7 = 5), xnS,1, . . . , xnS,14)> ∈ Rk∗ , such that the number
of exploratory variables is k∗ = 25.
The relatively high number of explanatory variables k∗ could result in (almost)
collinear regressors. When including the human capital variable In7(xn7 = 2)
we observe almost collinear variables. Therefore, In7(xn7 = 2) was excluded
and our results regarding human capital are measured against low or very
low education. In addition, we also checked the correlations of the k∗ = 25
regressors. This and missing warnings on collinearity provided by the R package
did not indicate problems related to multicollinearity. In addition, we abstract
from feedback effects from x˜n on yn (in more technical terms we assume
that the regressors x˜n are exogenous; see, e.g., Davidson and MacKinnon,
1993, p. 624-627). With probit and logit models P (yn = 1|x˜n, xn2 ≤ 1) =
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E (yn = 1|x˜n, xn2 ≤ 1) = F(β>x˜n), where β ∈ Rk∗ . The regression param-
eter βi describes the impact of x˜ni, i.e. the ith coordinate of x˜n, on the
conditional probability P (yn = 1|x˜n, xn2 ≤ 1) [equal to the conditional ex-
pectation E (yn = 1|x˜n, xn2 ≤ 1)]. To assign “self-explaining subscripts” to
the regression parameters βi we define the set I∗, which contains the k∗ = 25
names of explanatory variable provided in the first column of Table 2. That
is, I∗ := {Intercept, Frequency In2(xn2 = 1), . . . ,Human Capital In7(xn7 = 5),
Security xnS,1, . . . , Security xnS,13, Incertitude xnS,14}. Then, the notation βi,
i = 1, . . . , k∗, is equivalent to βIntercept, βFrequency In2(xn2=1), βGender xn3 , . . . ,
βIncertitude xnS ,14 . The function F(·) is called link function. For the logit model
the link function is provided by the logistic function, i.e.
P (yn = 1|x˜n, xn2 ≤ 1) = e
β>x˜n
1 + eβ>x˜n
, while for the probit model





where Φ (·) abbreviates the distribution function of the standard normal distribu-
tion. In this article parameter estimates, denoted by β̂, of the parameter vector
β are obtained by means of maximum likelihood estimation (by using the glm
function contained in the R package AER). To investigate the question how x˜ni
affects P (yn = 1|x˜n), the marginal effects
∂
∂ x˜ni
E (yn = 1|x˜n, xn2 ≤ 1) = F(β>x˜n)βi , (2)
can be obtained for any i = 1, . . . , k∗ (see, e.g., Greene, 1997; Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005). In contrast to the linear regression model, the marginal effects
described in (2) depend on the value of x˜n where (2) is evaluated. In the follow-
ing analysis, the term MEi abbreviates the marginal effect ∂∂x˜ni E (yn = 1|x˜n,
xn2 ≤ 1) evaluated at the conditionally expected value E (x˜n |xn2 ≤ 1). We ob-
tain an estimate of the marginal effect, M̂E i , by replacing β and E (x˜n |xn2 ≤ 1)
by their finite sample analogs β̂ and ¯˜xn = 1N∗
∑N∗
n=1 x˜n.
In contrast to the assumption of exogenous regressors, some users might have
decided to “install safety software”, to “read terms and conditions carefully at
every registration”, etc. after they had been offended and before they had been
interviewed (in which case regressor endogeneity arises). If this is the case,
we also obtain an impact of the offense variable yn to the security/incertitude
variables xnS, ·, marked by
?−→ in Figure 1, or to xn2 (for example a user stopped
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to use the Internet, i.e. xn2 = 2, after she or he was offended). In this case we
would observe reverse causality. If there are serious concerns that the persons
interviewed behaved in this way, instrumental variable estimation should be
performed, where we claim that finding good instruments for the given regression
is a difficult problem. Based on these arguments, we suggest to include questions
on possible changes in the users’ behavior when further questionnaire studies
are performed.
Table 2: Results obtained from the Logit and Probit Regression. Results obtained from the logit and
probit regressions. N ∗ = 2, 188 observations. yn , i.e. “personally offended”, is the binary dependent
variable, while the explanatory variables are provided in the first column (an intercept term is included).
The second and the sixth column provide the maximum likelihood estimates β̂i , i = 1, . . . , k∗, the
third and the seventh column provide standard errors, while the forth and the eighth column provide
p-values. Significant variables at the 5% significance level in boldface. The fifth and the last column
show estimates of the marginal effects ME i , i = 1, . . . , k∗.
Logit Model Probit Model
Variable β̂i SEi p-value ME i β̂i SEi p-value ME i
Intercept -1.5167 0.6538 0.0203 -0.2042 -0.9356 0.3648 0.0103 -0.2388
Frequency In2(xn2 = 1) -0.2690 0.2064 0.1924 -0.0362 -0.1414 0.1186 0.2330 -0.0361
Gender xn3 -0.4478 0.1803 0.0130 -0.0603 -0.2535 0.1010 0.0121 -0.0647
Age xn4 -0.0038 0.0094 0.6872 -0.0005 -0.0016 0.0053 0.7634 -0.0004
Inhabitants In5(xn5 = 1) 0.1407 0.2364 0.5517 0.0189 0.0815 0.1318 0.5365 0.0208
Inhabitants In5(xn5 ≥ 4) 0.2008 0.2500 0.4219 0.0270 0.1195 0.1400 0.3935 0.0305
Employment In6(xn6 = 1) -0.5126 0.3489 0.1418 -0.0690 -0.2974 0.2050 0.1468 -0.0759
Employment In6(xn6 = 2) -0.3927 0.3785 0.2996 -0.0529 -0.2220 0.2208 0.3146 -0.0567
Human Capital In7(xn7 = 3) 0.2572 0.4142 0.5347 0.0346 0.1532 0.2224 0.4910 0.0391
Human Capital In7(xn7 = 4) 0.7279 0.4201 0.0832 0.0980 0.4076 0.2275 0.0731 0.1040
Human Capital In7(xn7 = 5) 0.5718 0.4120 0.1651 0.0770 0.3217 0.2221 0.1474 0.0821
Security xnS ,1 -0.1711 0.1943 0.3787 -0.0230 -0.0898 0.1103 0.4154 -0.0229
Security xnS ,2 -0.2662 0.1741 0.1262 -0.0358 -0.1481 0.0981 0.1312 -0.0378
Security xnS ,3 0.3485 0.1916 0.0690 0.0469 0.1930 0.1071 0.0715 0.0492
Security xnS ,4 0.4077 0.2124 0.0549 0.0549 0.2242 0.1171 0.0555 0.0572
Security xnS ,5 -0.0252 0.1784 0.8877 -0.0034 -0.0063 0.1013 0.9505 -0.0016
Security xnS ,6 -0.2882 0.2005 0.1506 -0.0388 -0.1649 0.1149 0.1512 -0.0421
Security xnS ,7 0.3695 0.2164 0.0878 0.0497 0.2205 0.1203 0.0668 0.0563
Security xnS ,8 0.3405 0.1714 0.0471 0.0458 0.1829 0.0974 0.0603 0.0467
Security xnS ,9 0.0247 0.1793 0.8906 0.0033 0.0099 0.1015 0.9222 0.0025
Security xnS ,10 -0.0787 0.1783 0.6589 -0.0106 -0.0483 0.1006 0.6313 -0.0123
Security xnS ,11 -0.2041 0.2075 0.3253 -0.0275 -0.1202 0.1159 0.2994 -0.0307
Security xnS ,12 1.4315 1.0335 0.1660 0.1927 0.8700 0.6421 0.1755 0.2220
Security xnS ,13 -2.0427 1.0314 0.0476 -0.2750 -0.9950 0.4496 0.0269 -0.2539
Incertitude xnS ,14 0.2829 0.6232 0.6499 0.0381 0.1666 0.3507 0.6348 0.0425
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Table 2 provides the regression results. By looking at the probability values
(p-values), we observe that the regression intercept and the variable Gender are
highly statistically significant for both models. Since the estimates of βGender xn3
are negative, a smaller risk of an offense on the Internet is observed for women.
By means of the marginal effects we observe that a rise in the variableGender by
an infinitesimal unit, decreases the probability to be offended by approximately
6% times this infinitesimal unit. When applying a significance level of 5% the
variable “Frequency In2(xn6 = 2)” and the employment dummies are statistically
insignificant. At the 15% significance level the variable In6(xn6 = 1) (i.e., non-
full time employment) is significant. Since higher employment reduces the risk
to be offended on a significance of 15%, the regressions provide very weak
support for the learning arguments provided Talib et al (2010). Higher education,
measured by the variable Human Capital, interestingly hardly changes the
probability to be offended. Only for an education level corresponding to high
school (described by the dummy variable In7(xn7 = 4)) an increase in the
probability to be offended is observed at a significance level close to 10%. The
impacts of the variables Age, and Size of the City are statistically insignificant
(when applying significance levels ≤ 10 %). Finally, we investigate the impacts
arising from the various Security variables xnS, j . For both the logit and the
probit model, only the variables xnS,3 (“use different passwords at various
platforms”), xnS,4 (“install safety software”), xnS,7 (“never provide personal”),
xnS,8 (“read terms and conditions carefully at every registration”) and xnS,13
(“do not use social networks”) are significant at the 10% level, while only xnS,13,
for both models, and xnS,8, for the logit model only, are significant also at a 5%
significance level. The sign of β̂Secturity xnS ,13 is negative as expected (i.e. the
probability of an offense decreases), while – in contrast to our expectations –
the estimates β̂Security xnS ,3 , β̂Security xnS ,4 , β̂Secturity xnS ,7 and β̂Secturity xnS ,8 have
positive signs. Although the probability values for these parameters are larger
than 5%, as already discussed before, some of the responses/security activity
measured by questionnaire might happened after an offense and a reverse
causality problem is observed.
Summing up, by using the results of both regression methods and a signifi-
cance level of 5%, only the variables “xn3 – gender: being female” and “xnS,13
– do not use social networks” turned out to be statistically significant and reduce
the probability to be offended on the Internet.
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5 Conclusions
To prevent and reduce the risk of individuals to be offended on the Internet, more
detailed information on the socio-demographic as well as the risk-awareness
characteristics of the users with respect to Internet security becomes necessary.
This study uses questionnaire data from 3,000 Austrian individuals, recently
collected by Kirchner et al (2015), to provide information on these issues. The
sample used in this article, contains information on employment, education, age
and the frequency of Internet usage.
First, by means of a cluster analysis we investigate the question regarding
the groups of persons being offended on the Internet. The cluster analysis does
not provide a very clear picture. For each cluster containing offended users,
we observe – in parallel – a cluster with non-offended users having similar
characteristics. Second, we analyze the question whether the characteristics of
the users such as age and gender as well as various protection methods applied
by the users increase or decrease the risk to be offended on the Internet. By
means of probit and logit regressions we observe that being female and to
abstain from using social media significantly reduces the risk to be offended on
the Internet.
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Appendix
Further Information about the Data
The study of Kirchner et al (2015) is based on two surveys: The first sample
comprises data from the Austrian population with an age between 14 and 49
years. The second sample considers parents (both or one parent) of children
aged 10 to 13 years. In order to create the basis for the surveys and focus groups,
8 interviews with experts of the IT-division of the Austrian Ministry of the
Interior (BM.I) as well as police-attorneys have been conducted. During the
expert-interviews the problems of using the social media and future challenges
were discussed. The results of the expert-interviews were used to design the
questionnaires.
To obtain these data, Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews were per-
formed. The data finally consists of 3,000 Austrians aged 14 to 49 years and 500
parents of children aged 10 to 13 years by using a standardized questionnaire.
According to the requirements of the study, the characteristics of gender, age
and place of residence (federal state) were considered as representative criteria.
To obtain these data, in total, about 50,000 people were contacted in order
to achieve the desired 3,500 interviews. This corresponds to a response rate
of around 7%. For about 37% of the calls, no one picked up; about 18%,
the number from the phone book was invalid. Approximately 22% refused to
participate in the survey and approximately 4% broke off the interview during
the conversation.
The N = 3,000 survey was held in the period from July 9, 2014 to October
12, 2014. With the goal to obtain information on young users, in addition to
the N = 3,000 sample used in this article, Kirchner et al (2015) interviewed
500 parent(s) from December 11, 2014 until May 1, 2015. In those cases where
the parents had more than one child in this age group, they were asked at the
beginning of the interview how many children in this age group they have - and
a random selection was set to which of their children they should refer.
In the statistical analysis provided in this article only the N = 3,000 sample
is used. For this sample of N = 3,000 interviews we observe the following: Let
ζ abbreviate some attribute of the population measured in percentage terms.
Then, given some point estimate ζ̂ based on the sampleX of size N = 3,000, the
95% confidence interval (based on the normal approximation following from
the asymptotic analysis) is
[
ζ̂ − 1.8 %, ζ̂ + 1.8 %
]
. In addition, by comparing
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the percentages observed for the population to their sample analogs, we observe
that all percentages observed for the population are contained in the interval
“value observed in the sample ± standard error”. By this we consider the survey
samples as representative. That is, the distribution of the characteristics of
gender, age and place of residence in the sample corresponds to that in the
population. The subset of questions of the study of Kirchner et al (2015) used
in this article are provided in the Tables A-3 to A-7. In particular, Table A-3
provides the questions used to construct the binary variable yn, which is equal
to one if user n was offended and zero else. Tables A-5 and A-6 provide the
questions used to construct the socio-economic and the socio-demographic
variables xn2 to xn7. Finally, Table A-7 shows the list of questions to construct
the security and incertitude variables xnS, j , j = 1, . . . ,14. Since responses to
the open questions were very rare, the answers to these questions cannot be
exploited in our analysis.
Table A-3: Questions related to the variable offense, yn (1/2).
Questions in German Questions in English
Opferwerdung Victimization
Waren Sie selbst oder jemand aus Ihrem Um-
feld bereits einmal von einer der folgenden krim-
inellen Aktivitäten auf Facebook oder einem an-
deren sozialen Netzwerk betroffen?
Have you or someone in your area already been
affected by one of the following criminal activi-
ties on Facebook or any other social network?
a) Ja, ich selbst, und zwar durch: a) Yes, I myself, by means of:
Q.1.1 Phishing – Abfrage von Benutzerdaten
über gefälschte Anmeldeseiten oder
gefälschte E-Mails von Facebook oder
einem anderen sozialen Netzwerk.
Q.1.2 Hacking - Illegale Einsicht eines Ac-
countes, um z. B. Passwörter oder Kred-
itkartendaten zu stehlen.
Q.1.3 Profile Copying/-Cloning / Identitäts-
diebstahl – Jemand anderes nimmt
in Facebook oder in einem anderen
sozialen Netzwerk eine fremde Identität
an.
Phishing – Fake log-in pages or fake e-mails
from Facebook or another social network (user
data are requested).
Hacking – An account is illegally viewed, e.g.
to steal passwords or credit cards.
Profile Copying / Cloning – Someone else
uses a foreign identity in Facebook or another
social network.
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Table A-4: Questions related to the variable offense, yn (2/2).
Questions in German Questions in English
Q.1 Opferwerdung Victimization
Q.1.4 Fake-Accounts – Anlegen gefälschter
Accounts in Facebook oder in einem
anderen sozialen Netzwer, um zu an-
deren Freunden bzw. auf deren Profile
zu gelangen.
Q.1.5 Schadhafte Software / Malware – An-
griff mit Computerviren oder Trojanern,
die demSystem schaden (z.B. über Face-
book Würmer).
Q.1.6 Cyber Bullying – Cyber Mobbing unter
Schülern.
Q.1.7 Sexting – Verbreitung von (privaten)
sexuellen Fotos oder Inhalten in Face-
book oder in einem anderen sozialen
Netzwerk.
Q.1.8 Happy Slapping – Verbreitung
gewaltverherrlichender (Privat-)Videos
in Facebook oder in einem anderen
sozialen Netzwerk.
Q.1.9 Cyber Stalking –Verfolgung oder Beläs-
tigung einer Person in Facebook oder in
einem anderen sozialen Netzwerk.
Q.1.10 Cyber Mobbing – Psychologisches Ter-
rorisieren einer Person in Facebook oder
in einem anderen sozialen Netzwerk,
wobei bewusst Druck ausgeübt wird.
Fake Accounts – Using fake accounts in Face-
book or any other social network to access to
other friends data or to access their profiles.
Malware – Attacking and harming computer
systems via viruses or Trojans.
Cyber Bullying – Cyber Mobbing among
pupils.
Sexting – Dissemination of (private) sexual
photos or contents on Facebook or any other
social network.
Happy Slapping – Glorification of violence via
(private) videos on Facebook or any other so-
cial network.
Cyber Stalking – Tracking or harassing of a per-
son on Facebook or any other social network.
Cyber Mobbing – Psychologically terrorizing
of a person on Facebook or any other social
network by consciously exerting pressure.
b) Ja, jemand aus meinem Umfeld. b) Yes, someone from my environment.
c) Nein, kenne niemanden, der betroffen war. c) No, I don’t know anybody who was offended.
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Table A-5: Questions related to the socio-economic and socio-demographic variables x2n , . . . , xn7
(1/2).
Questions in German Questions in English
Q.2 Häufigkeit Frequency
Zu Beginn denken Sie bitte ganz allgemein an
sozialeNetzwerke, wie beispielsweise Facebook.
Als welchen der folgenden Nutzertypen würden
Sie sich selbst einstufen?
At the beginning, please think of social networks
such as Facebook. Which of the following user
types would you consider yourself?
a) Intensiv-Nutzer/-in – Ich habe einen Account
in zumindest einem sozialen Netzwerk und
nutze diesen täglich oder fast täglich.
b) Gelegenheits-Nutzer/-in – Ich habe einen Ac-
count in zumindest einem sozialen Netzwerk
und nutze diesen gelegentlich.
c) Ehemaliger Nutzer – Ich habe bzw. hatte
einen Account in zumindest einem sozialen
Netzwerk, nutze im Moment aber keinen
oder ich habe alle gelöscht.
d) Gar-nicht-Nutzer/-in – Ich hatte nie einenAc-
count in einem sozialen Netzwerk.
Intensive user – I have an account on at least
one social network and use it at least (or almost)
daily.
Casual user – I have an account on at least one
social network and use it occasionally.
Former user – I have or had an account on at
least one social network, but I use none or all
deleted it / them.
No user – I never had an account on a social
network.
Q.3 Geschlecht (male / female) Sex (male / female)









Q.5 Wie viele Einwohner/innen (EW) hat die
Gemeinde oder Stadt, in der Sie wohnen?
How many inhabitants has the municipality or
city where you live?
a) unter 10.000 EW
b) 10.000 bis unter 50.000 EW
c) 50.000 bis unter 100.000 EW
d) 100.000 bis unter 250.000 EW
e) mehr als 250.000 EW
f) weiß nicht / keine Angabe
less than 10,000 inhabitants
10,000 to less than 50,000 inhabitants
50,000 to less than 100,000 inhabitants
100,000 to less than 250,000 inhabitants
more than 250,000 inhabitants
don’t know / no answer
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Table A-6: Questions related to the socio-economic and socio-demographic variables x2n , . . . , xn7
(2/2).
Questions in German Questions in English
Q.6 Sind Sie zurzeit berufstätig? Was trifft auf
Sie zu?






e) In Pension bzw. Rente
f) Hausfrau bzw. –mann
g) In Berufsausbildung, Lehre, Zivil- oder Prä
senzdienst
h) SchülerIn, StudentIn
i) Sonstiges, und zwar:











don’t know / no answer
Q.7 Humankapital Human Capital
Was ist Ihre höchste abgeschlossene Schulbil-
dung?





d) Berufsbildende mittlere Schule
e) Allgemeinbildende höhere Schule ohne
Matura
f) Allgemeinbildende höhere Schule mit
Matura
g) Berufsbildende höhere Schule (HTL, HAK)
h) Abiturientenlehrgang, Kolleg, Pädagogische
Akademie
i) Fachhochschule, Universität, Hochschule
j) Sonstiges, und zwar:





Grammar school without High school Diploma
Grammar school with High school Diploma
Vocational secondary school with High school
Diploma (HTL, HAK)
Course for high school-graduate, College, Uni-
versity of Teacher Education
University of Applied Sciences, Universities
Other, namely:
don’t know / no answer
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Table A-7: Questions related to the security/incertitude variables, xnS ,1, . . . , xnS ,14.
Questions in German Questions in English
Q.S Sicherheitsmaßnahmen Security Measures
Welche Vorkehrungsmaßnahmen setzen Sie per-
sönlich (bzw. haben Sie persönlich gesetzt), um
sich vor kriminellen Aktivitäten auf Sozialen
Netzwerken zu schützen?
What security measures do you personally (resp.
have you personally set) to protect yourself
against criminal activities on social networks?
QS.1 Datenschutzeinstellung bei der Reg-
istrierung anpassen.
QS.2 Regelmäßig Passwörter ändern.
QS.3 Auf unterschiedlichen Plattformen unter-
schiedliche Passwörter verwenden.
QS.4 Sicherheitssoftware installieren.
QS.5 Soziale Netzwerke nicht über un-
gesichertes WLAN nutzen.
QS.6 Nur mit Personen in Kontakt treten, die
man auch real kennt.
QS.7 Keine persönlichen Daten preisgeben.
QS.8 AGBs vor Registrierung genau lesen.
QS.9 Die automatische Passwortspeicherung
deaktivieren
QS.10 Cookies löschen.
QS.11 Mikrofon und Kamera des PCs
überkleben.
QS.12 Hausverstand / Menschenverstand
nutzen.
QS.13 Keine Verwendung sozialer Netzwerke.
QS.14 Sonstiges:
QS.15 Gar keine.
Adapt protection settings at the first registra-
tion.
Regularly change password.
Use different passwords on various platforms.
Install security software.
Do not access social networks via unsecured
WLAN connections.
Only communicate with persons known in real
life.
Never provide personal information.
Read terms and conditions carefully at every
registration.
Deactivate automatic save password facilities.
Delete cookies.
Hide / tape microphone and camera.
Use common sense.
No use of social networks.
Others:
None / I do not care about any security issues.
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